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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
where: 1. ten years have elapsed since the first docketing of the judg-
ment... . ." The primary purpose of the provision is to permit the
judgment creditor to revive the lien on the judgment debtor's real
property that he obtains under CPLR 5203(a). 179
In Brookhaven Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Hoppe, 180 plaintiff
instituted an action on a money judgment through personal service of
a summons and omplaint upon defendant some three months before
ten years had expired from the first docketing of the judgment. The
District Court, Suffolk County, dismissed the action without prejudice
as premature, on the ground that the expiration of ten years is a con-
dition precedent to the action.' 8 '
To prevent establishment of a superior lien immediately after
expiration of the ten-year period, the action should be allowed slightly
prior to expiration. Entry of judgment could be delayed to take effect
upon said expiration.
ARTicLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5228(a): Section utilized to permit indirect action by injured
party against insurance company.
Under CPLR 5228(a), a judgment creditor can move for the ap-
pointment of a receiver to administer property of the judgment debtor
"or to do any other acts designed to satisfy the judgment." Such a mo-
tion is addressed to the court's discretion. 82 The section is ordinarily
utilized when management of the judgment debtor's property by an-
other is more expedient,8 3 but may be invoked in special circumstances
to expedite satisfaction of a judgment.
A novel use of CPLR 5228(a) is illustrated by In re Kreloff,84
wherein petitioner obtained appointment of a receiver to bring suit
against an insurance company as legal representative of respondents.8 5
The company had not appeared or defended on behalf of respondents,
and petitioner had recovered a judgment substantially in excess of
179 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5014, commentary at 573 (1967); 5 WK&M 5014.04.
18065 Misc. 2d 1000, 319 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1971).
181 Id. at 1001-02, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 566-67, citing Underhill v. Phillips, 30 App. Div.
238, 51 N.YS. 801, 802 (2d Dep't 1898); Frontuto v. Frontuto, 206 Misc. 214, 131 N.Y.S.2d
735, 737 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1954); Susskind v. Freund, 147 Misc. 486, 488, 263 N.Y.S.
300, 302 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1933); Heyman v. Wick, 142 Misc. 577, 255 N.YS. 356, 358
(N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1932). These cases were decided under the predecessor statute, CPA 484.
182 E.g., Drucker v. Drucker, 53 Misc. 2d 446, 448, 278 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1967); see 6 WK&M 5228.04.
188 See 7B MCKXNNEY's CPLR 5228, commentary at 137 (1963).
184 65 Misc. 2d 692, 319 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County (1971).
185 Id. at 693, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
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the policy.3s An injured party cannot directly maintain any action
against an insurance company to recover money in excess of the in-
sured's policy, even where there is bad faith, negligence, or fraudulent
conduct by the insurer in failing to settle before trial.'8 7 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court, Bronx County, appointed a receiver to bring suit,
respondents' right of action against the company being a property
right.88
CPLR 5231(b): Income execution based on gross income.
The Legislature faces the difficult problem of balancing the con-
flicting interests among judgment creditors, judgment debtors and the
public regarding income executions, formerly called garnishees. Sec-
tion 684(1) of the CPA permitted a lien not exceeding ten percent in
cases "where any wages, ... are due and owing to the judgment debtor,
or shall thereafter become due and owing to him, to the amount of
thirty dollars or more per week . . . ." CPLR 5231(b), the successor
statute, provides in pertinent part: "Where a judgment debtor is re-
ceiving or will receive more than eighty-five-dollars per week from any
person, an income execution for installments therefrom of not more
than ten percent thereof, may be issued.... ." It is clear that the former
law was amended to benefit the judgment debtor by increasing the
sum he could earn without subjecting himself to execution. Moreover,
there also has been speculation that substitution of the term "receiv-
ing" for the phrase "wages due and owing" was intended to decrease
earnings subject to execution by replacing gross salary with net take-
home pay as the basis for determining whether income execution is
permissible. 8 9
The Supreme Court, Kings County, resolved this issue, in County
Trust Co. v. Berg,190 by holding that gross salary is to be considered in
determining whether a judgment debtor is subject to income execu-
tion.19' Noting that the legal meaning of the words "receiving" and
"receive" are not necessarily the same as their colloquial or dictionary
definition, the court consulted the legislative history and prior case
law. 92 Under CPA 684(1), gross salary was the basis for determining
186 Id. at 692, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
187 Browdy v. Statewide Ins. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 610, 289 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1968).
188 65 Misc. 2d at 693, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
189 See 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 5231, supp. commentary at 115 (1970); County Trust Co.
v. Duell, 52 Misc. 2d. 411, 412, 275 N.YS.2d 910, 911 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1966).
190 65 Misc. 2d 533, 318 N.Y.S. 2d 154 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1971).
1911 Id. at 534, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
192 Id., 318 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
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